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I. INTRODUCTION
In the words of the United States Supreme Court, "We are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."'  While the Court's
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
1
Cogar: Government Hostility to Religion: How Misconstruction of the Esta
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
sentiment, uttered nearly a half-century ago, may seem hollow in our secular,
post-modern society, the fact remains that Americans are a religious people.
Nearly two thirds of our citizens consider their religious beliefs "very impor-
tant."2 Moreover, at least ninety percent of Americans profess a belief in God.3
Religion encompasses virtually every aspect of life for its adherents.
Likewise, our religious (or irreligious) views profoundly influence how we in-
teract with the world. As Alexis de Tocqueville observed, "There is hardly any
human action, however particular it may be, which does not originate in some
very general idea men have conceived of the Deity, of his relation to mankind,
of the nature of their souls, and of their duties to their fellow-creatures." 4 Ac-
cordingly, the freedom of religion is the most cherished civil right possessed by
Americans, which the First Amendment bespeaks: "Congress shall make no law
respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."5
The First Amendment's guarantee of religious freedom is the corner-
stone of the Bill of Rights. Indeed, "[a] society is only as just and free as it is
respectful of this right, especially toward the beliefs of its smallest minorities
and least popular communities. In recent decades, however, courts have failed
to protect religious liberties consistently, which may be partially explained by
the social devaluation of religion and the embrace of secularism as the norm in
public life. Arguably, the courts' failure here primarily stems from an aban-
donment of a principled understanding of the Religion Clauses. In particular,
courts have interpreted the Establishment Clause in a remarkably unhistorical
and paradoxical fashion, placing it at odds with the Free Exercise Clause. Con-
sequently, many judges have ratified the suppression of private, non-coercive
expression of religious belief in public institutions and forums.
Justice Brennan warned that the Establishment Clause "may not be used
as a sword to justify repression of religion or its adherents from any aspect of
public life."7 Despite this admonition, courts have allowed government entities
to "wield" the Establishment Clause with disturbing frequency in order to ex-
clude religious expression from workplaces, schools, and public forums. Even
though many other courts condemn such religious hostility, governments con-
2 Religion and Ethics Newsweekly, Exploring Religious America: The Poll, at
http:l/www.pbs.org/wnetlreligionandethics/week534/specialreport2.html (last visited Sept. 26,
2002).
3 The Roper Center, Believer Nation, at
http:/lwww.ropercenter.uconn.edulpubperlpdf/ppl 13c.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2002).
4 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 150 (Richard D. Heffner ed., 1956).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6 The Williamsburg Charter, in CHARLES DREW, A PUBLIC FArrH 120 (2000); see also Mi-
chael W. McConnell, Religion and Constitutional Rights: Why Is Religious Liberty the "First
Freedom"?, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 1243 (2000).
7 McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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tinue to employ the Establishment Clause to discriminate against religion. As a
result, religious freedom has profoundly suffered.
The overarching goal of this note is to demonstrate that the Establish-
ment Clause does not excuse but prohibits government hostility to religion in
any form. 8 Part II will elucidate the constitutional prohibition of religious hos-
tility by briefly examining the original intent of the Establishment Clause, dis-
pelling common myths about the clauses, and surveying the Supreme Court's
recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Part IIn will analyze recent cases in
which the Establishment Clause has been used as a "sword" for religious dis-
crimination. Part IV will demonstrate how the Lemon test, the Supreme Court's
much maligned Establishment Clause analysis, is inadequate to scrutinize reli-
gious hostility as illustrated by a recent case of first impression.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION OF HOSTILITY TO RELIGION
As Professor Edward McGaffney observes, "It should not be very diffi-
cult to embrace the concept that the Constitution prohibits hostility to religion." 9
Nonetheless, "[a]s obvious as this conclusion might be to some, it seems.., that
many remain to be persuaded on the matter."' Such is the goal of the following
analysis.
Section A explores the original intent of the Establishment Clause, pri-
marily focusing on the words and acts of the Founders of our nation and First
Congress. Section B seeks to dispel the common myths associated with the Es-
tablishment Clause. Finally, section C reviews the Establishment Clause juris-
prudence adopted by the current Supreme Court.
A. The Original Intent of the Establishment Clause
A principled examination of Establishment Clause jurisprudence appro-
priately begins with original intent. Although the legislative history for this
constitutional provision is not definitive, 1 its contours may be delineated with
confidence by investigating the common views of religion shared by those who
wrote and first upheld the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Thus, "[a]n under-
standing of the original intent of the founding fathers with respect to the role of
8 The purpose of this note is not to explore the limits of government assistance to religious
groups. Likewise, this note will not criticize generally applicable laws which encumber the free
exercise of religion. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990).
9 Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Hostility to Religion, American Style, 42 DEPAUL L. REV.
263, 268 (1992).
10 Id.
I I See Martha McCarthy, Religion and Education: Whither the Establishment Clause?, 75 IND.
L.J. 123 (2000).
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religion in America is a necessary first step in reading the religion clauses of the
Constitution."'
12
By and large, the Founding Fathers 13 were men of strong religious con-
viction. Many actively served as religious leaders and ministers. 14 Moreover,
most of the Founders emphatically asserted that religion is essential to American
society and government.15 For example, William Paterson, signer of the Consti-
tution and Supreme Court Justice, said that "[r]eligion and morality . .. [are]
necessary to good government, good order, and good laws."' 16 George Washing-
ton similarly declared:
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political pros-
perity, Religion and morality are indispensable supports. In
vain would that man claim the tribute of Patriotism, who should
labor to subvert these great Pillars of human happiness, these
firmest props of the duties of Men and citizens. The mere Poli-
tician, equally with the pious man ought to respect and to cher-
ish them. 17
Likewise, Thomas Jefferson acknowledged the importance of religion to gov-
ernment: "[The] liberty to worship our Creator in the way we think most agree-
able to His will [is] a liberty deemed in other countries incompatible with good
government and yet proved by our experience to be its best support."'
18
The Continental Congress translated many of the Founders' sentiments
into action. This assembly, which met from 1774 until the ratification of the
Constitution in 1789, adopted numerous measures that explicitly acknowledged
the importance of religion to government and society, including religious proc-
12 DEREK H. DAVIS, RELIGION AND THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1779, at 8-9 (2000).
(internal quotation omitted); see also id. at 23.
13 "The Founding Fathers" is an oft-used term with an imprecise meaning. "Although incapa-
ble of exact definition, the term 'Founding Fathers' commonly refers to the leaders who forged the
new nation. It frequently is reserved for those who participated in promulgating one or more of
three documents: the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights." Arlin
M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1559,
1582 (1989). This definition will be used for the purpose of this note.
14 See DAVID BARTON, ORIGINAL INTENT: THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, & RELIGION 139-
143 (2d ed. 1997). Barton contends that the "evidence is clear that not only can none of [the
Founders] be called an atheist, only the smallest handful would fit today's definition of a deist."
Id. at 143.
15 "Free government was not to be led by men and women free of religion. It was the view of
the Founders that if the American experiment was to succeed, a reliance upon God was neces-
sary." WILLIAM J. BENNETT, OUR SACRED HONOR 365 (1997).
16 BARTON, supra note 14, at 157.
17 George Washington, "Farewell Address," in BENNETT, supra note 15, at 368.
18 BARTON, supra note 14, at 157.
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lamations for Thanksgiving and days of fasting, appointing an official chaplain
to offer daily prayers, and appointing military chaplains.' 9 The Continental
Congress also frequently attended church services as a body.2°
The Founders cherished religious freedom not only because of their per-
sonal convictions but also because they were well aware of the effects of the
"religious despotism" that had prevailed in Europe and the colonies.2 More-
over, their value of freedom of conscience and their attitudes about the relation-
ship between religion and government were deeply influenced by theologians,
philosophers, and writers such as Luther, Calvin, Locke, and Milton.22 From
these thinkers, the Founders adopted the ideals of inalienable rights, religious
toleration, and the separate spheres of authority appropriated to the church and
state.23
Of course, the Founders did not speak with one voice concerning the
proper relationship between religion and government. 24 Nonetheless, despite the
fact that "the Founders represented a broad spectrum of views, they were virtu-
ally unanimous in the belief that the republic could not survive without relig-
ion's moral influence. Consequently, they did not envision a secular society,
but rather one receptive to voluntary religious expression.
' 25
In addition to the Founders' views on religion and religious liberty, cer-
tain acts of the First Congress provide valuable insight into the meaning of the
Establishment Clause. Perhaps most notably, "[i]n the very week that [the First]
Congress approved the Establishment Clause as part of the Bill of Rights, it en-
19 See DAVIS, supra note 12, at 200.
20 Id. at 201.
21 DAVIS, supra note 12, at 9; cf. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 633 (5th ed. 1891) ("It was under a solemn consciousness of the dangers from
ecclesiastical ambition, the bigotry of spiritual pride, and the intolerance of the sects, thus exem-
plified in our domestic as well as in foreign annals, that it was deemed advisable to exclude from
the national government all power to act on the subject [of religion]."). Joseph Story served on
the Supreme Court from 1811 to 1845 and during much of that time he also taught at Harvard Law
School. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 104 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As such,
Story's commentaries arguably provide the most authoritative guide in interpreting the Constitu-
tion.
22 See Adams & Emerrich, supra note 13, at 1561-62.
23 See id.
24 Adams and Emmerich classify the Founders into three groups: Enlightenment separation-
ists, political centrists, and pietistic separationists. See id. at 1594. Enlightenment separationists
like Paine and Jefferson "adhered to anticlerical views and focused on insulating government from
religious domination." Id. at 1595. Conversely, pietistic separationists sought to protect "religion
from the corrupting effect of governmental interference." Id. Political centrists such as George
Washington and John Adams "regarded religion as an essential source of personal and social
morality and, when in office, openly and repeatedly recognized its importance in the nation's
public life." Id.
25 Id.
20021
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acted legislation providing for paid Chaplains for the House and Senate. 26
Moreover, "[t]he day after the First Amendment was proposed, Congress urged
President Washington to proclaim 'a day of public thanksgiving and prayer, to
be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many and signal favours
of Almighty God.',, 27 These two acts alone persuade Professor David Currie to
conclude that "[t]he original understanding [of the Establishment Clause] thus
appears to have been that [it] did not forbid public endorsement of religion as
such but only establishment as it had existed in England and in some of the
states: the creation of a single official church.,
28
The First Congress also reenacted the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,
which allotted grant money to sectarian schools in the Northwest Territory.
29
The ordinance specifically stated that "[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge, be-
ing necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and
the means of education shall forever be encouraged." 30 Although the Bill of
Rights was just proposed the day the Northwest Ordinance was passed, "it
seems highly unlikely that the House of Representatives would simultaneously
consider proposed amendments to the Constitution and enact an important piece
of territorial legislation which conflicted with the intent of those proposals." ' 3'
In Lynch v. Donnelly,32 the Supreme Court emphasized that the "First
Congress was a Congress whose constitutional decisions have always been re-
garded, as they should be regarded, as of the greatest weight in the interpretation
of that fundamental instrument." 33 Thus, the enactments of this legislative body,
which drafted the First Amendment, clearly indicate that the Establishment
Clause was not intended to constrain religious expression or proscribe all gov-
ernment support of religion.
As this brief historical survey illustrates, the Founders and the First
Congress sought to protect and encourage religion, which the text of the Relig-
ion Clauses confirms. Therefore, hostility toward religion is antithetical to the
intent and plain meaning of the First Amendment. In particular, the Establish-
ment Clause insulates religious groups from government hostility by preventing
the federal government from engaging in sectarian favoritism. Supreme Court
Justice Joseph Story explains:
26 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984).
27 id. at 675 n.2.
28 David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The First Congress and the Structure of
Government, 1789-1791, 2 U. CH. ROUNDTABLE 161, 169 (1995).
29 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 100 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
33 Id. at 674.
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The real object of the amendment was. . . to exclude all rivalry
among Christian sects, and to prevent any national ecclesiastical
establishment which should give to a hierarchy the exclusive
patronage of the national government. It thus cuts off the
means of religious persecution (the vice and pest of former
ages), and of the subversion of the rights of conscience in mat-
ters of religion, which had been trampled upon almost from the
days of the Apostles to the present age. The history of the par-
ent country had afforded the most solemn warnings and melan-
34
choly instructions on this head ....
B. Misinterpretations of the Religion Clauses
As the preceding sections indicate, the Founders and the First Congress
agreed that religion not only must be vigorously protected, but also should play
an integral role in public life. The Religion and Free Speech Clauses explicitly
embody these principles. However, in the past fifty years, Supreme Court
precedent, legal commentary, and public ignorance have combined to pervert
the meaning and purpose of Religion Clauses, especially the Establishment
Clause. Consequently, this general misunderstanding has tacitly encouraged
government hostility toward religion and religious groups.36 Two fundamental
misinterpretations of the Religion Clauses persist: the strict separation of church
and state and the presumed tension between the Free Exercise and Establish-
ment Clause.
1. Strict Separation of Church and State
In Everson v. Board of Education,37 the Supreme Court introduced the
concept of the "separation of church and state" as a formal judicial construction
of the First Amendment. Everson broadly interpreted the Establishment Clause
as prohibiting any form of government assistance to religion.38 The Court's
34 STORY, supra note 21, at 631-32.
35 See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995) (plu-
rality) ("[11n Anglo-American history ... government suppression of speech has so commonly
been directed precisely at religious speech that a free-speech clause without religion would be
Hamlet without the prince. . Accordingly, we have not excluded from free-speech protections
religious proselytizing, or even acts of worship.") (citations omitted); Phillip B. Kurland, The
Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 839, 856 (1987)
("The speech and press clauses were concerned with religious speech as well as political
speech.").
36 See Gaffney, supra note 9, at 299.
37 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
38 See id. at 15-16. Compare the Everson's construction of the Establishment Clause, 150
years after its passage, with Justice Story's explanation of its purpose, supra note 34 and accom-
2002]
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First Amendment construction rested largely on the writings of James Madison
and Thomas Jefferson. 39 Quoting Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptist As-
sociation, 4° the Court stated that the Establishment Clause "was intended to
erect 'a wall of separation between Church and State. ' 4l Following Everson,
the congressional prohibition to make a law "respecting the establishment of
religion" eventually became known as the "separation of church and state."
The phrase "separation of church and state" concisely embodies the im-
port of the Establishment Clause-the federal government may not establish a
national church. As such, the phrase is useful insofar as it acknowledges the
panying text; see also supra note 21.
39 See id. at 11-16. Professor Michael Allen Paulsen asserts that Everson's inclination to rely
almost exclusively on the views of Madison and Jefferson to discern the intent of the Establish-
ment Clause was fundamentally flawed in two respects:
First, it too closely equates the personal views of certain men with the mean-
ing of the constitutional provision which they helped draft, a provision which
underwent important revisions and which was voted on and ratified by a large
and diverse collection of state ratifying assemblies. Second, it wrongly as-
sumes that the views animating a state constitutional provision after which the
language of a part of the federal Bill of Rights was patterned corresponded to
the intended meaning of the national provision.
Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 319 (1986).
40 For a thorough exposition of the historical context of the Danbury Baptist letter and the
origins and interpretation of the "wall of separation" metaphor, see Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas
Jefferson, a Mammoth Cheese, and the "Wall of Separation Between Church and State," in
RELIGION AND THE NEW REPUBLIC: FAITH IN THE FOUNDING OF AMERICA 65, (James H. Hutson ed.,
2000).'
41 Everson, 330 U.S. at 16. For the full text of Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists, see
Dreisbach, supra note 40, at 73-74. The Everson Court not only neglected to quote the language
of Jefferson's letter but also failed to place it in context. Notwithstanding its strict separationist
rhetoric, the Everson court upheld the provision of public transportation to parochial school stu-
dents. 330 U.S. at 17. Nonetheless, the strict separation construction of the Establishment Clause
has tainted First Amendment jurisprudence for over five decades. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
42 Note, however, that state governments were permitted to establish a church, and many did
so. See id. at 99 n.4. Even Jefferson acknowledged that states had the power to prescribe reli-
gious exercise, which was fully consistent with his understanding of federalism. See Dreisbach,
supra note 40, at 78-82. Moreover,
every American colony, from its foundation down to the revolution, with the
exception of Rhode Island, if, indeed, that State be an exception, did openly,
by the whole course of its laws and institutions, support and sustain in some
form the Christian religion; and almost invariably gave a peculiar sanction to
some of its fundamental doctrines. And this has continued to be the case in
some of the States down to the present period, without the slightest suspicion
that it was against the principles of public law or republican liberty.
STORY, supra note 21, at 629. Whether or not it was prudential or conducive to religious liberty,
[Vol. 105
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sovereignty of both institutions and articulates a fundamental tenet of the Con-
stitution.43 However, Everson extended this idea much further, effectively de-
claring that "the original purpose of the Establishment Clause was to create an
absolute separation of the spheres of civil authority and religious activity by
forbidding all forms of government assistance or support for religion. '"44 This
doctrine had no basis in constitutional law.45 In fact, the only precedent cited in
support of its strict separationist rationale was Reynolds v. United States,
46
which was the only previous Supreme Court decision to invoke Jefferson's
"wall of separation." Reynolds, however, did not interpret the Jeffersonian
metaphor with the breadth and indifference to religion that Everson did. In-
stead, the Reynolds Court, after quoting the pertinent language in Jefferson's
letter to the Danbury Baptists, concluded that "Congress was deprived of all
legislative power over mere [religious] opinion, but was left free to reach ac-
tions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.
'47
Furthermore, Reynolds implicated the Free Exercise Clause, not the Establish-
ment Clause, which further belies the precedential validity of the Everson deci-
sion.
In addition to its tenuous legal justification, the strict separationist doc-
trine contravenes the purpose of the Religion Clauses in that it serves to exclude
religion from "public life and discourse',a-a notion that undoubtedly would
that this practice existed without significant condemnation by the Founders strongly suggests that
the strict separation metaphor never represented the purpose of the Establishment Clause.
43 See Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson and the Danbury Baptists Revisited, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 805, 811 (1999).
44 DAVIS, supra note 12, at 11 (emphasis added).
45 Indeed, the doctrine also fails to represent Jefferson's own philosophy underlying his "wall
of separation" metaphor:
A careful review of Jefferson's actions throughout his public career suggests
that he believed, as a matter of federalism, the national government had no ju-
risdiction in religious matters, whereas state governments were authorized to
accommodate and even prescribe religious exercises. Therefore, Jefferson
saw no inconsistency in authorizing a religious proclamation as a state official
and refusing to release a similar proclamation as the federal chief executive.
The "wall" metaphor was not offered as a general pronouncement on the pru-
dential relationship between religion and all civil government; rather, it was,
more specifically, a statement delineating the legitimate constitutional juris-
dictions of the federal and state governments on matters pertaining to religion.
Dreisbach, supra note 40, at 78. Consider also that "Jefferson participated in neither the Constitu-
tional Convention nor the First Congress. Given that he was not a Framer, it is perhaps surprising
that the Supreme Court adopted his controversial 'wall of separation' metaphor as descriptive of
the [religion] clauses." See Adams & Emmerich, supra note 13, at 1585.
46 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (affirming the polygamy conviction of a Mormon).
47 Id. at 164.
48 Dreisbach, supra note 40, at 92; see also Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 274 (4th Cir.
2002]
9
Cogar: Government Hostility to Religion: How Misconstruction of the Esta
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
appall the Founding Fathers.49 Although the Founders sought to separate church
and state, they intended this separation to be institutional, not cultural in na-
ture.50  According to Judge Arlin Adams and Professor Charles Emmerich,
"[lthe principal evil [that the Founders] sought to avoid was an alliance of civil
and ecclesiastical power that would threaten religious liberty; that religion and
society should be separated was a notion that would have [been] met with uni-
form disapproval., 51  Thus, the Establishment Clause imposes jurisdictional
limits of civil authority, not constraints on religious exercise or belief.5
2
The Supreme Court has retreated from its strict separation interpretation
of the Establishment Clause, adopting more of an accommodationist position.53
Nonetheless, despite its weak foundation in precedent and history, the ubiqui-
tous misunderstanding of the "separation of church and state" persists in public
institutions and continues to distort contemporary understanding about religious
liberties. Advocacy groups like the Freedom From Religion Foundation and the
Anti-Defamation League declare that "[t]he Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment forbids any government support of religion, ' 54 and that the "foun-
ders . . . mandated the strict separation of church and state. 55 One commentator
goes as far as to suggest that recent executive actions (or lack thereof) by Presi-
dent George W. Bush and Attorney General John Ashcroft regarding stem cell
2001) ("[T]he Religion Clauses must not be interpreted with a view that religion be suppressed in
the public arenas in favor of secularism."). For examples of such religious exclusion, see infra
Parts IV and V.
49 See generally supra Part II.A.
5o Adams & Emmerich, supra note 13, at 1615.
51 Id.; see also supra note 34 and accompanying text; Brown, 258 F.3d at 274 ("[The Estab-
lishment Clause] does not require total separation of Church and State."); see also Kurland supra
note 35, at 843 ("'[C]hurch and state' is an erroneous label that actually describes the conflict
between the crown and the mitre concerning the governance of the people. In this sense, the
United States never has suffered through the problems of church and state, except perhaps in the
very early history of New England.").
52 See Dreisbach, supra note 40, at 78; cf Thomas Jefferson, "A Bill for Establishing Reli-
gious Freedom," in BENNErr, supra note 15, at 326 ("[T]he opinions of men are not the object of
civil government, nor under its jurisdiction[.]"). Consequently, only when overt religious acts
breach the peace, thereby transgressing the sovereignty of the state, may the state purposefully
suppress religious exercise. See id.; DAVIS, supra note 12, at 212; Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 163.
53 See infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
54 Freedom from Religion Foundation, Mayoral Proclamation: Give Thanks for State/Church
Separation Week, http://www.ffrf.org/proclamations/thanksgiving.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2002);
cf supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
55 Anti-Defamation League, Separation of Church and State: A First Amendment Primer,
http://www.adl.org/issue-religious-freedom/separation-cs-primer.asp. (last visited Sept. 26,
2002).
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research, abortion clinics, and physician-assisted suicide violated the Establish-
ment Clause because they were based on "purely religious motivations. 56
2. The Mythical Tension Between the Religion Clauses
The strict separationist view generated another fundamentally inaccu-
rate First Amendment interpretation that views the Establishment Clause and
Free Exercise Clause in tension with one another.57 Proponents of this interpre-
tation assert that the Free Exercise Clause "giveths," and the Establishment
Clause "takeths away." For example, some argue that private religious expres-
sion may be curtailed where it can be interpreted as state endorsement of relig-
ion. 8
Textual and historical analyses of the First Amendment lend no support
for this construction. First, it bears emphasizing that the Religion Clauses re-
strain government action from interfering with religious exercise. 59 As such, the
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause complement each other as
"coguarantors" of religious liberty. 60 To construe them otherwise ignores not
56 Sherry F. Colb, A Creeping Theocracy: How The U.S. Government Uses Its Power To En-
force Religious Principles, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20011121.html (Nov. 21, 2001).
The motivations for any individual's action are complex and are ultimately influenced by experi-
ence, circumstances, personal affiliations, and religious beliefs, to name just a few factors. Ac-
cordingly, it is difficult to accept Professor Colb's emphatic (and clairvoyant?) assertion that
President Bush and Attorney General Ashcroft acted solely upon "religious motivations." How-
ever, even if her assertion is correct, her claim that such religiously-motivated acts (which them-
selves are constitutional) violate the Establishment Clause is preposterous. This analysis argua-
bly renders the Free Exercise Clause-drafted and ratified by men of strong religious conviction
for primarily religious purposes-unconstitutional. Cf. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641
(1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Government may not inquire into the religious beliefs and
motivations of officeholders-it may not remove them from office merely for making public
statements regarding religion, or question whether their legislative actions stem from religious
conviction.").
57 See Gaffney, supra note 9, at 299 ("The prevailing view [of the Religion Clauses] ... is that
the two provisions are in deep tension with one another .... ); Chad Allred, Guarding the Treas-
ure: Protection of Student Religious Speech in the Classroom, 22 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 741, 742
(1999).
58 See, e.g., Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 799-800
(1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59 Cf Lee v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 672, 695 (1992) (per
curiam) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The First Amendment is a limitation on gov-
ernment, not a grant of power .... A fundamental tenet of our Constitution is that government is
subject to constraints which private persons are not."); Kurland, supra note 35, at 860 ("[T]he
Constitution was concerned with limiting government and not with limiting or enhancing ecclesi-
astical institutions.").
60 Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 256 (1963) (Brennan, J., con-
curring); see also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982) ("[The Establishment Clause's]
constitutional prohibition of denominational preference is inextricably connected with the continu-
ing vitality of the Free Exercise Clause."); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 122
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only their plain meaning but also the historic impetus for their inclusion in the
Bill of Rights.61 Thus, the Establishment Clause may be reasonably perceived
as limiting the Free Exercise Clause only when government offers exclusive
benefits to religion. Indeed, in the words of Justice Story, "[t]he real difficulty
lies in ascertaining the limits to which government may rightfully go in fostering
and encouraging religion. 62 Even in this context, however, the issue is not
whether an individual may freely express his or her religious beliefs, but rather
whether the government may exclusively promote, finance, or otherwise facili-
tate such expression.
As one commentator also notes, the "bifurcation .. .of the Religion
Clauses has led to problems both in theory and practice. 63 A preeminent ex-
ample of this is the Establishment Clause test introduced in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man,64 which has been one of the most inconsistently applied and unworkable
judicial analyses ever developed by the Supreme Court.65  In addition, the "bi-
(1982) ("The purposes of the First Amendment guarantees relating to religion were twofold: to
foreclose state interference with the practice of religious faiths, and to foreclose the establishment
of a state religion familiar in other 18th-century systems."); Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 274
(4th Cir. 2001) ("The Establishment Clause limits any governmental effort to promote particular
religious views to the detriment of those who hold other religious beliefs or no religious beliefs,
while the Free Exercise Clause affirmatively requires the government not to interfere with the
religious practices of its citizens.").
61 See KDM ex rel. WJM v. Reedsport Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 1046, 1057 (9th Cir. 1999) (Klein-
feld, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1010 (2000):
The Free Exercise Clause prohibits government anticlericalism as vigorously
as the Establishment Clause prohibits government from preferring a particular
religion. Our revolution, unlike, say, the French, Mexican, or Russian, evinced
no hostility to any organized religion. Our founding manifesto, the Declara-
tion of Independence, says that people are "endowed by their Creator" with
their fundamental rights. The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause are not in tension, as though one said people can practice their religion,
and the other said "but not in public." The Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses complement each other, both advancing the purpose of freedom of re-
ligion. One guarantees individuals the right to freely exercise their religion,
and the other assures that this free exercise will be unburdened by government
preference for a different religion. Americans are entitled to a government that
does not discriminate against them because of their religion, even with bur-
dens that those who do not bear them see as merely a slight inconvenience.
62 STORY, supra note 21, at 628. James Madison referred to this as the "line of separation."
Dreisbach, supra note 40, at 91; cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1983) ("In each case,
the [Establishment Clause] inquiry calls for line-drawing[.]"); Brown, 258 F.3d at 275 ("The line
between improper establishment and accommodation 'must be delicately drawn both to protect the
free exercise of religion and to prohibit its establishment.' But the Supreme Court has repeatedly
drawn that line in a manner that has upheld a broad range of statutory accommodations against
Establishment Clause challenges.") (quote and citations omitted).
63 Gaffney, supra note 9, at 299.
64 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
65 Gaffney, supra note 9, at 299-300. See generally infra Part V.
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furcation" view, if carried to its logical extreme, would result in a "clash" of the
Religion Clauses.66 Once again, this view defies the rationale, historical under-
standing, and plain meaning of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
Arguably, "the very attempt to pit [the Religion Clauses] against [each]
other is itself a subtle manifestation, however unintentional, of hostility toward
religion., 67 But regardless of its ideological origins, the ignorance of both the
discernible intent of the Religion Clauses and current Supreme Court jurispru-
dence has bred hostility and indifference toward religious expression in public
forums. 68 The Founders never endorsed (nor does the Constitution permit) this
result.
C. Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
1. The Mandate of Benevolent Neutrality and Absolute
Prohibition of Hostility
In recent years, the Supreme Court seems to have abandoned the strict
separationist doctrine adopted in Everson.69 Accordingly, the principle of reli-
gious accommodation imbues the Court's current jurisprudence.7° Walz v. Tax
Commission of New York71 is one of the first decisions indicating this ideologi-
cal shift:
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and
all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will not toler-
ate either governmentally established religion or governmental
interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed
governmental acts there is room for play in the joints productive
of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise
to exist without sponsorship and without interference.72
The Court has since confirmed that the "benevolent neutrality" articu-
lated by Walz does not exclude religion from the public sphere but requires its
66 Id. at 299.
67 See id. at 300.
68 See infra Part IV.
69 See McCarthy, supra note 11, at 130.
70 See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 275 (4th Cir. 2001) (providing examples of the
Court's accomodationist jurisprudence).
71 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding a state's tax exemption for property owned by religious
organizations and used solely for worship purposes).
72 Id. at 669; see also Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)
("[T]he government's attitude toward religion must be one of 'wholesome neutrality."').
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accommodation on equal terms with other ideas and groups.73 According to the
Fourth Circuit, "[the] authorized, and sometimes mandatory, accommodation of
religion is a necessary aspect of the Establishment Clause jurisprudence be-
cause, without it, government would find itself effectively and unconstitution-
ally promoting the absence of religion over its practice., 74 Indeed, as one dis-
trict court asserts, "[t]he First Amendment was never intended to insulate our
public institutions from any mention of God, the Bible or religion. When such
insulation occurs, another religion, such as secular humanism, is effectively
established. 75
The benevolent neutrality required by the Establishment Clause does
not prohibit the government from indirectly benefiting religious groups, even
where that benefit is substantial.76 However, where the state acts in a discrimina-
tory manner, "the Establishment Clause forbids subtle departures from neutral-
ity. 77 Consequently, as numerous Supreme Court opinions affirm, the Estab-
lishment Clause prohibits any affirmative hostility toward religion.
78
2. Manifestations of Government Hostility Toward Religion
Governmental hostility toward religion assumes many forms and may
be exhibited by any public institution. Such hostility may reside in individual
officials who are either ignorant of the constitutional guarantees of religious
liberty, or are simply intolerant of or indifferent to others' religious faith. 7
Religious hostility may also be structural "in the sense that general cultural pat-
73 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1983) (noting that the Constitution "affirma-
tively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of religion, and forbids hostility toward
any.").
74 Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 275 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Ehlers-Renzi v. Connelly
Sch. of the Holy Child, Inc., 224 F.3d 283, 287 (4th Cir. 2000)).
75 Crockett v. Sorenson, 568 F. Supp. 1422, 1425 (W.D. Va. 1983); see also Schempp, 374
U.S. at 225 ("[T]he State may not establish a 'religion of secularism' in the sense of affirmatively
opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus 'preferring those who believe in no religion over
those who do believe."') (citation omitted).
76 See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390, 401 (1983) (sustaining a neutral tax deduc-
tion for certain educational purposes where over 90% of the tax benefits flowed to religiously-
affiliated institutions); see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S.Ct. 2460 (2002) (upholding
school voucher program); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680, 683.
77 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971).
78 See, e.g., Gaffney, supra note 9, at 266 n.21 (canvassing myriad Court decisions that discuss
the constitutional prohibition of religious hostility); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) ("[T]he First Amendment forbids an official
purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or of religion in general.") (citations omitted); Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) ("government may not be overtly hostile to relig-
ion").
79 Gaffney, supra note 9, at 269-70.
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terns are reflected within the institutions of government, including the courts. 80
Both varieties of hostility often manifest themselves economically and politi-
cally, 81 which Larson v. Valente82 illustrates. In Larson, the Supreme Court
struck down a Minnesota charitable solicitation statute that "impos[ed] certain
registration and reporting requirements upon only those religious organizations
that solicit more than fifty per cent of their funds from nonmembers. '83 In addi-
tion to finding the statute facially unconstitutional, the Larson Court found that
its legislative history revealed hostility toward a religious group, which alone
84justified invalidating the statute.
Generally speaking, religious hostility is most obvious where govern-
ment limits or prohibits speech or assembly solely on the basis of its religious
character. Thus, suppression of private religious speech constitutes hostility
toward religion.85 Similarly, a government evinces religious hostility by denying
religious groups equal access to a forum.86 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit recently
emphasized that "extirp[ing] from public ceremonies all vestiges of the religious
acknowledgments that have been customary at civic affairs in this country since
well before the founding of the Republic" amounts to an unconstitutional hostil-
ity toward religion.87
80 Id.
81 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
82 456 U.S. 228, 230 (1982).
83 Id. at 230.
84 See id. at 254-55.
85 See Chandler v. Siegelman, 180 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated and remanded,
530 U.S. 1256 (2000), reinstated, 230 F.3d 1313 (11 th Cir. 2000); Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d
650, 658-59 (8th Cir. 1995) (An employer's order directing an employee to "'cease any activities
that could be considered to be religious proselytizing, witnessing, or counseling' . . . exhibited a
hostility to religion that our Constitution simply prohibits."); cf Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 871 (1982) (Brennan, J.) (plurality opinion) ("Our Constitution does not permit the official
suppression of ideas.").
86 See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 846 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Withholding access would leave an impermissible perception that
religious activities are disfavored: . . . 'if a State refused to let religious groups use facilities open
to others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward religion."') (quoting Bd. of
Educ. of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990) (plurality opinion));
Peck v. Upshur County Bd. of Educ., 155 F.3d 274, 284 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that the "[exclu-
sion] of religious literature as such from [a] forum [that was] created to further the schools' educa-
tional mission by exposing the county's students to a variety of age appropriate private speech
would evince the hostility toward religious speech ....").
87 Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 236 (6th Cir. 1997) (affirming the constitutionality
of a nonsectarian prayer or moment of silence at a public university function); see also Murray v.
Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 158 (5th Cir. 1991) ("[R]equiring the City [of Austin] to remove all dis-
plays of [an] insignia [that includes a Christian cross], arguably evinces not neutrality, but instead
hostility, to religion.").
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Although the discriminatory effect may be less apparent, government
disapproval of religion also qualifies as impermissible religious hostility. The
First Amendment prohibits state actions "born out of animus to religion in gen-
eral or [a religion] in particular."88 Moreover, the Court has unqualifiedly de-
clared that government cannot be "overtly hostile to religion"89 or act with an
"official purpose" to disapprove of any religion.90 In Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Board v. Pinette,91 seven Justices agreed that the Establishment Clause
prohibited government endorsement of a particular religious belief.92 Therefore,
as a matter of logic, express hostility to a particular religious belief must be
similarly proscribed.93 Accordingly, a governmental policy condemning a relig-
ion or religious practice should constitute a hostile act in violation of both the
Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.
Ill. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AS AN EXCUSE FOR RELIGIOUS
DISCRIMINATION
Despite the Supreme Court's evident accomodationist shift in Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence, many government entities and officials (includ-
ing federal court judges) continue to adhere to a strict separationist view. Con-
sequently, they wield the Establishment Clause as a "sword" to exclude reli-
gious expression from publicly-supported forums. The following discussion
will focus on two contexts in which such religious hostility-justified by "the
separation of church and state"--is prevalent: government employment and
public schools.
A. Government Employment
According to Laura Nash, a business ethicist at Harvard Divinity
School, "[s]pirituality in the workplace is exploding." 94  In a recent survey,
88 Hernandez v. Comm'r Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 696 (1989).
89 Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989).
90 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993);
see also Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (acknowledging that "[clases involving government speech on religious topics... require an
analysis focusing on whether the speech endorses or disapproves of religion, rather than whether
the government is neutral with regard to religion").
91 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995) (plurality).
92 See id. at 765-67 (plurality); id. at 773-776 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (joined by Justices
Souter and Breyer).
93 Cf. infra Part V.C.
94 Michelle Conlin, Religion in the Workplace: The Growing Presence of Spirituality in Cor-
porate America, Bus. WK., November 1, 1999, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/careers/content/jan1990/b3653001.htm.
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nearly half of Americans said that they had talked about their religious faith at
work within twenty four hours of being asked the question. 95  Indeed, religious
expression and exercise at work is growing more common in offices across the
country. This increase in religious practice is not surprising, considering the
substantial amount of time that Americans spend at work and the increased na-
tional interest in spiritual matters.96
In light of the "revival" of religious practice in the workplace, the
amount of freedom granted to government employees to express and exercise
their religious beliefs is an issue of growing importance. The pertinent require-
ments of federal law are reasonably straightforward and provide generous pro-
tection of religious liberties in the workplace, at least facially. Government em-
ployers are generally forbidden from taking any adverse employment action
against an employee on the basis of religion. 97 Conversely, government em-
ployers must accommodate an employee's religious observance or practice
unless it would create an undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's busi-
ness.98 However, "employees have the right to work in an environment that is
free of religious harassment, i.e., behavior or conduct 'sufficiently severe and
pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work en-
vironment. ''99 Thus, employees and employers may enjoin such activities that
create a "hostile work environment."']°°
Despite the clear mandates of federal law, government employers often
demonstrate hostility to religion under the guise of avoiding an Establishment
Clause violation. In Bishop v. Aronov, l0' a state university ordered Dr. Phil
Bishop, a physiology professor, to discontinue innocently expressing religious
beliefs during his classes and holding optional after-class lectures in which he
discussed "Evidences of God in Human Physiology."' 10 2 Bishop sought declara-
95 Debbie N. Kaminer, When Religious Expression Creates a Hostile Work Environment: The
Challenge of Balancing Competing Fundamental Rights, 4 NYU J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 81, 83
n.3 (2000) (citing GEORGE GALLUP, JR. & TIMOTHY JONES, THE NEXT AMERICAN SPIRITUALITY:
FINDING GOD IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 72 (2000)).
96 See id. at 82-83.
97 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). See generally THE WHITE HOUSE, GUIDELINES ON
RELIGIOUS EXERCISE AND RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE (1997), available
at http://oeeo.psc.gov/oeeo/12rl.html.
98 42 U.S.C. § 20000) (2000).
99 Deborah H. Karpatkin & Christopher P. Reynolds, Religious Discrimination in the Work-
place, 604 PLI/Lit 189, 222 (1999) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67
(1986)).
1oo See id. at 222-23.
101 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991).
102 Id. at 1069.
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tory and injunctive relief against the university for the violation of his rights to
free speech and free exercise of religion.
10 3
The district court emphasized that "[tihe University's only justification
for exclusion [of Bishop's religious speech was] an effort to avoid an establish-
ment of religion."' 4  Bishop's speech, however, could not reasonably be con-
strued as a university endorsement of religion or as coercive in nature. His
comments in class were primarily prefatory remarks that explained how the pro-
fessor's Christian beliefs influenced his perspective as a teacher and person. 10 5
Bishop never proselytized his students, engaged in any religious practices like
prayer or Bible-reading, or incorporated religious teachings within his curricu-
lum.10 6 Moreover, the university did not contend that Bishop failed to teach his
class properly.1
0 7
Bishop's optional class was equally benign. Attendance was completely
voluntary and could not affect grades, since Bishop employed a blind grading
system. 0 8 Perhaps most importantly, the class itself represented a classic exam-
ple of the free exchange of ideas, which the university exists to foster. 1°9 None-
theless, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the university's order
did not impermissibly discriminate against religious speech and was a reason-
able restriction on Dr. Bishop's rights of speech and free exercise of religion."0
The court stated that the university's order "furthers the unstated but accepted
principle of separation of church and state."'
I
Brown v. Polk County' 12 also illustrates hostility to religion in the nameof the Establishment Clause. In Brown, a government employer severely repri-
103 Id. at 1070.
104 Bishop v. Aronov, 732 F. Supp. 1562, 1566-67 (N.D. Ala. 1990). The district court held in
favor of the Dr. Bishop before the Eleventh Circuit reversed.
105 Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1068. Bishop also intended these infrequent remarks to build rapport
with his students. See id.
106 See id. at 1068-69.
107 Actually, Dr. Bishop's supervisor considered him an excellent professor, recommending
him for early tenure. Bishop, 732 F. Supp. at 1563-64. In addition, Bishop was an accomplished
researcher. Id. at 1564.
108 Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1069. This fact is significant and was given little weight by the court of
appeals. According to the university, the primary basis for prohibiting Bishop from holding op-
tional lectures of a religious nature was to prevent coercion of students, who presumptively would
feel obligated to attend the lectures in order to preserve or enhance their grades. See id.
109 In fact, university policy permitted professors to share non-religious personal views in class
and organize after-class meetings discussing non-religious topics. See id. at 1069-70.
110 Id. at 1076-78. In so holding, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment for Bishop and directed the district court to enter summary judgment for the university. Id.
at 1078.
III Id.
112 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
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manded plaintiff Isaiah Brown for his religious activities in the workplace be-
fore eventually firing him. Brown's condemned actions were innocuous. On
one occasion, Brown, the county's director of information services, asked a sec-
retary to type Bible study notes for him. 1 3 In addition, several employees vol-
untarily said prayers in Brown's office before the beginning of some workdays
and in some department meetings during the day. 14 The prayers, however, were
spontaneous, infrequent, and concerned matters of county business) 15 Finally,
in one meeting, Brown "affirmed his Christianity" and referred to Biblical pas-
sages in admonishing his employees for their poor work ethic. Nonetheless, the
evidence revealed that Brown did not discriminate against any employee based
on their religious belief and that his own religious activities and beliefs had no
discernible effect on the work environment. 1
6
Brown's employer, the government of Polk County, Iowa, learned of
the aforementioned activities after an internal investigation into religious activi-
ties conducted in Brown's department. 17 In response, the county administrator
reprimanded Brown in writing, directing him to "immediately . . . cease any
activities that could be considered to be religious proselytizing, witnessing, or
counseling and ... further to cease to utilize County resources that in any way
could be perceived as to be supporting a religious activity or religious organiza-
tion."'"18  The county administrator later ordered Brown "to remove from his
office all items with a religious connotation, including a Bible in his desk."'' 19
Not long thereafter, the county administrator asked Brown to resign for ostensi-
bly unrelated reasons. 20 Brown refused to do so and was subsequently fired.'
12 1
Although the court did not require the county to accommodate all of
Brown's religious activities, it held that the original reprimand exhibited an im-
permissible hostility towards religion. 122 Moreover, the court rightly declared
that by requiring Brown to remove all religious items from his office, the county
"[took] sides in a religious dispute," which the Establishment Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause prohibited. 23 Likewise, the court held that the county
11,3 ld. at 652.
114 Id. at 652, 656.
115 Id. at 656.
116 See id. at 656-57.
117 Id. at 652.
118 Id. at 652-53.
119 Id. at 653.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 655-66, 659.
123 Id. at 659.
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discharged Brown primarily because of his religious activities in violation of
federal and state employment law. 24 In its defense, the county government as-
serted that its interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation permitted it
to absolutely ban religious expression in its workplaces. 25 The court appropri-
ately rejected the defendants' argument:
Such a position is too extravagant to maintain, for it gives a
dominance to the establishment clause that it does not have and
that would allow it to trump the free exercise clause .... The
clauses cannot, in the nature of things, make conflicting de-
mands on a government, and government is charged with mak-
ing sure that its activities are confined to the ample and well-
defined space that separates them.1
26
B. Public Schools
Historically, public schools have served as a battleground for many, if
not most, significant Establishment Clause cases. 27 In response to the confu-
sion and controversy surrounding religion in schools, the Secretary of the De-
partment of Education sent guidelines on "Religious Expression in Public
Schools" to every school superintendent in the country in August of 1995.128
The guidelines, re-released in 1998, provide a concise and accurate summary of
the law concerning religion in public schools.
29
As the Secretary's guidelines reflect, much law is either directly or indi-
rectly settled with respect to students' religious freedoms within the school
grounds. The guidelines state generally that
schools may not forbid students acting on their own from ex-
pressing their personal religious views or beliefs solely because
they are of a religious nature. Schools may not discriminate
against private religious expression by students, but must in-
stead give students the same right to engage in religious activity
124 Id. at 657.
125 Id. at 659.
126 Id.
127 See McCarthy, supra note 11, at 125. In one of the most recent - and controversial - Estab-
lishment Clause cases involving public schools, the Ninth Circuit ruled that teacher-led recitation
of the Pledge of Allegiance (containing the phrase "under God") was unconstitutional. Newdow
v. Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 608-12 (9th Cir. 2002).
128 DEPT. OF EDUCATION, GUIDELINES ON RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS (revised
May 1998), available at http://www.ed.gov/Speeches/08-1995/religion.html [hereinafter "GUIDE-
LINES"].
129 See id.
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and discussion as they have to engage in other comparable ac-
tivity.13°
Consequently, students can engage in voluntary prayer or religious discussion
during noninstructional time.' 3' Likewise, students may "distribute religious
literature to their schoolmates on the same terms as they are permitted to dis-
tribute other literature that is unrelated to school curriculum or activities.' 32
Students at public secondary schools may also initiate religious clubs that enjoy
the same privileges and rights of access as non-religious clubs.' 33 Moreover,
students may express religious beliefs in their academic assignments. 1
34
The Secretary's guidelines and much current federal law reaffirm the
Supreme Court's declaration that students do not "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."' 35 Sadly
though, many teachers, principals, school boards, and even some courts shame-
lessly continue to employ the strict separationist rationale to qualify and dimin-
130 Id. The guidelines note, however, that "the right of private religious expression in school
does not include the right to have a 'captive audience' listen." Id. While this is a reasonable
assertion, it should not represent an absolute rule. Indeed, where students make non-disruptive,
non-confrontational, and non-proselytizing presentations about religion or religious belief to a
"captive audience," there is no legitimate pedagogical or legal rationale for prohibiting it. To the
contrary, such presentations stand to enrich public education and enlighten our religiously diverse
population.
131 Id. West Virginia readers are probably familiar with the recent controversy surrounding the
injunction of the student-led prayer at the St. Albans High School graduation. See Deveney v. Bd.
of Educ. of Kanawha Co., No. 2:02-0499 (S.D. W. Va. May 30, 2002) (granting temporary
restraining order). At the time of this writing, the federal district court's order continues to spur
argument among state citizens. Unfortunately, however, the court's decision was badly misunder-
stood - at least in terms of its legal rationale and implications. Judge Copenhaver's ruling primar-
ily concerned the Kanawha County School Board's administrative policy, which expressly al-
lowed for an invocation at county graduation ceremonies. See id. at 10-12. The policy's religious
connotation and its requirement of review and pre-approval by the high school principal were
central to the court's finding that the policy would not withstand constitutional scrutiny. Id.
However, the court's holding did not suggest that the First Amendment categorically proscribes
prayer at graduation ceremonies or other school events. If a student prayed on his own initiative
at graduation, without any school involvement, the prayer could not be prohibited. Accordingly,
student-led prayer at graduations or other school ceremonies is permissible insofar as it originates
solely from the students and is not purposely facilitated by school officials. See Santa Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 313 (2000) ("[Nlothing in the Constitution as interpreted by this
Court prohibits any public school student from voluntarily praying at any time before, during, or
after the schoolday. But the religious liberty protected by the Constitution is abridged when the
State affirmatively sponsors the particular religious practice of prayer."). Therefore, the students
who recited the Lord's Prayer during the moment of silence at the St. Albans commencement did
not violate the court order. This is not to say, however, that such prayer is always prudent.
132 GUIDELINES, supra note 128.
133 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2000).
134 GUIDELINES, supra note 128.
135 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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ish the constitutional freedoms granted to public school students, both young
and old. For example, on a recent Valentine's Day, Morgan Nyman, a second
grader at a Wisconsin public school, attempted to distribute valentines with
messages such as "Jesus loves you" and "Freely rely on God."'136 School offi-
cials refused to allow Morgan to give her classmates these cards in order to
avoid violating the "separation of church and state."'' 37 Instead, they required
Morgan to distribute them before or after school. 138 Morgan's classmates, how-
ever, were not prohibited from distributing valentines during the school day.
139
The eight year old girl was "devastated by the reaction of the school offi-
cials., 140 After Morgan's parents filed suit in federal court, the school board
agreed to settle by revising the school district's policy 14' and by publicly apolo-
gizing for the past actions. 142 The settlement also required the board to pay the
plaintiffs' lawyers $15,000 in legal fees and court costs. 14
3
Unfortunately, unlike Morgan, some children are unsuccessful in their
attempt to vindicate their right to express their private religious views. For ex-
ample, Zachary Hood twice suffered religious discrimination at his elementary
school in New Jersey-and received no relief from the courts.' a The first inci-
dent occurred in the fall of 1994, while Zachary was in kindergarten. He and his
classmates were "asked to make posters depicting things for which they were
thankful."'' 45 Zachary's poster professed his thanks to Jesus. 46 When the regu-
lar classroom teacher was absent, an unidentified person (presumably the substi-
tute teacher) removed Zachary's poster because of its religious content. 47 The
poster was eventually returned to display but "in a less prominent location than
it had previously occupied."'
148
136 Amy Hetzner, Board Allows Religious Valentine's Day Cards, MILW. J. SENT, Aug. 29,
2001, at IA.
137 Id. Morgan was also prohibited from distributing religious tracts at Halloween. Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Andrea Billups, Religious Freedom Sought in Schools, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2001, at A6.
141 Under the old policy, which singled out all things religious, "a student would be allowed to
pass out a Britney Spears CD to friends, but a student who wanted to give away a Christian CD
could not." Id. Was this the school district's idea of "character education?"
142 See Hetzner, supra note 136.
143 Id.
144 See C.H. v. Oliva, 990 F. Supp. 341 (D.N.J. 1997), aff'd, 226 F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2000).
145 Id. at 346.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
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The second incident took place in the following school year. Zachary's
first grade teacher, Grace Oliva, rewarded him for his reading ability. Ms. Oliva
allowed students reaching a certain level of reading proficiency to read a book
of their choosing to the rest of the class.149 Zachary chose to read a story called
"A Big Family" from The Beginner's Bible. 50 The narrative is an adaptation of
chapters 29-33 from the Book of Genesis and focuses on Jacob's family and his
reunion with his brother, Esau.151 The story neither contains any mention of
God nor any religious themes whatsoever. 152 Nonetheless, Ms. Oliva would not
allow Zachary to read "A Big Family" to his classmates "because of its religious
content."'' 53 Instead, Zachary was only allowed to read his story to Ms. Oliva
outside of class, although the other students could read their "non-religious"
stories to the entire class.'
54
Zachary's parents filed suit against Oliva and other school defendants,
claiming that their actions deprived Zachary of his constitutional rights to free
exercise of religion and freedom of expression. 55 The federal district court
granted defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. 56 The court con-
cluded that "relocating the poster of Jesus and disallowing [Zachary] to read
The Beginner's Bible to his class... were reasonably related to legitimate peda-
gogical concerns.' 57 Emphasizing that Zachary had no constitutional right to
have "the poster of Jesus displayed in any particular location," the court found
that "relocating" his poster did not restrict his speech. 158 Furthermore, the court
reckoned that reading "A Big Family" from The Beginner's Bible would likely
communicate the school's endorsement of the book to the children, notwith-
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 For the complete text of the story, see Oliva, 990 F. Supp. at 347 n.3.
152 See id. The court conceded that the story was "fairly innocuous" and had "no overt reli-
gious theme." Id. at 353-54.
153 Id. at 347. Specifically, Ms. Oliva told Carol Hood that her son could not read the story to
the class "because it might influence other students." Oliva, 226 F.3d at 204 (Alito, J., dissent-
ing). Mrs. Hood then spoke with the school principal, who told her that reading the story "was the
equivalent of 'praying,"' and that the story "might upset Muslim, Hindu or Jewish students." Id.
(It is reasonable to assume that Zachary's principal was unaware that the Islamic and Jewish faiths
recognize the Book of Genesis as scriptural authority.) Nonetheless, while school teachers and
administrators could only speculate if a child would be upset by "A Big Family," they could be
confident that prohibiting its reading would upset one child-Zachary Hood.
154 Oliva, 990 F. Supp. at 347.
155 See id. at 351-52.
156 Id. at 346.
157 Id. at 353.
158 Id.
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standing the story's benign nature. 159 Thus, the court asserted that requiring
Zachary to read "A Big Family" to only Ms. Oliva "was a proper accommoda-
tion of [his] right to free expression and the principle of separation of church
and state."16° The Third Circuit Court of Appeals summarily affirmed the dis-
trict court holding.
161
Although the district court in C.H. v. Oliva emphasized that the impres-
sionable age of the children weighed heavily in its decision, the type of religious
discrimination endured by Zachary is not limited to elementary school students.
In Settle v. Dickson County School Board,162 the Sixth Circuit upheld a teacher's
refusal to allow one of her students to write a research paper about Jesus Christ.
The teacher, Dana Ramsey, assigned her ninth-grade class to write a paper about
an "interesting, researchable, and decent" topic.' 63 Ms. Ramsey emphasized that
"she wanted them to learn how to research a topic, synthesize the information
they gathered, and write a paper using that information."'164 Students were re-
quired to use four sources for their research and could not "merely expound on
their own ideas.' 65 However, the students could choose their own topics, sub-
ject to the teacher's approval. 166
Brittney Settle, a student in Ms. Ramsey's class, first chose to write her
paper on "Drama."'167 Considering this topic too broad, Brittney decided instead
to write about "The Life of Jesus Christ.' 68 Although Ms. Ramsey had not pre-
159 Id. at 354. Consider the chain of logic required to make this conclusion: First, a child reads
a story from The Beginner's Bible which has no overt religious connotations. Next, the child's
classmates note the title of the book from which the story comes. Then, these children, who are
apparently quite sophisticated and keenly observant first graders, deduce that the teacher and the
school endorse the Bible and the religions based upon it. Does it thus follow, without discovery or
trial, that reading "A Big Family" to first graders breaches the constitutional prohibition of making
a law which "respects the establishment of religion?"
160 Id. at 354. (emphasis added). Compare the Third Circuit's strict separationist rationale with
the Supreme Court's observation in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952):
When the state encourages religious instruction ... it follows the best of our
traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accom-
modates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not
would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a
callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those who
believe in no religion over those who do believe.
161 C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 203 (3rd Cir. 2000).
162 53 F.3d 152, 153 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 989 (1995).
163 Id. at 153.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 154.
167 Id.
168 See id.
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approved the new topic, Brittney submitted an outline of the paper. 169 Ms.
Ramsey refused to accept the outline and required Brittney to choose a different
topic.' 7° When confronted by Brittney's father about her decision, Ms. Ramsey
explained that "she would accept a paper on religion as long as it did not deal
solely with Christianity or the Life of Christ."'' Brittney subsequently submit-
ted another outline entitled "A Scientific and Historical Approach to Jesus
Christ," which Ms. Ramsey also rejected. 72 Brittney's family took the matter to
the school board and eventually to federal court, claiming that her freedom of
speech had been violated.
In the school board hearings and depositions taken for the case, Ms.
Ramsey proffered six reasons for her refusal to approve Brittney's topic. First,
she asserted that Brittney failed to acquire prior approval for her topic. 73 Sec-
ond, the teacher believed it would be difficult for Brittney to objectively write
about a topic relating to her strongly held beliefs. ' 74 Third, she stated that any
discussion about personal religious beliefs "[is] just not an appropriate thing to
do in a public school.' 75 Fourth, Ms. Ramsey indicated that the purpose of the
paper was to have students research an unfamiliar topic. Thus, allowing Britt-
ney to draft an outline without much research defeated the purpose of the exer-
cise. 176 Fifth, she contended that "the law says we are not to deal with religious
issues in the classroom," which required her to prohibit the paper from being
written.' 77 Finally, Ms. Ramsey determined that only one source (i.e., the Bible)
was available for Brittney's topic, precluding its submission since four sources
were required. 1
78
Ms. Ramsey's rationales are transparent and pretextual.179 On the two
occasions in which she refused to allow Brittney to write about Jesus Christ, she
gave no pedagogical or legal justification. Likewise, the lack of prior approval
of Brittney's religious topic was clearly inconsequential since Mrs. Ramsey
169 See id.
170 See id.
171 Id.
172 Settle v. Dickson Co. Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 154 (6th Cir. 1995). The principal, the super-
intendent of schools, and the school board all supported Ms. Ramsey's decision. See id.
173 See id.
174 See id. In the same vein, Ms. Ramsey thought the paper would be difficult to grade in that
Brittney may construe her criticisms as directed toward Brittney's religious faith. See id.
175 Id.
176 See id.
177 Id. It is reasonable to infer that she was alluding to the "separation of church and state."
178 See id.
179 Even the concurring judge conceded that "some of Ms. Ramsey's after-the-fact reasons are
not very convincing." Id. at 157 (Batchelder, J., concurring).
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allowed Brittney to choose different topics after submitting her original topic for
approval. Moreover, other students were permitted to research and write about
topics such as "Spiritualism," "Reincarnation," and "Magic Throughout His-
tory," which all have strong religious connotations. 180 However, despite the
patent inconsistencies within Ms. Ramsey's testimony, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals found "no basis" to discern "a real dispute of fact about Ms. Ram-
sey's motives." 18' As such, the court ruled in favor of the school board, affirm-
ing the district court's grant of summary judgment. 182
Even when the courts enjoin religious discrimination, schools can find
ways to legally suppress private religious expression, despite a significant cost.
At Mission Viejo High School in southern California, a group of students organ-
ized a Fellowship of Christian Athletes ("FCA") club.183 When the students
sought formal recognition of the club at the high school, the principal rejected
their application, declaring that a school-sponsored student religious club would
violate the Establishment Clauses of the United States and California Constitu-
tions.184 The Court of Appeals of California disagreed, holding that the Equal
Access Act185 required the school district to grant formal club status to FCA.
18 6
However, instead of officially recognizing the FCA club, the school district
abolished all 29 clubs on four of the district's campuses. 187 To justify the dis-
trict's decision, School District Superintendent Bill Manahan said that the FCA
"represent[ed] opinions and beliefs that we feel are counterproductive with re-
spect to our students.' 88 When parents complained about the blanket prohibi-
tion of student clubs, "one board member told the school newspaper, 'Blame the
Christians."" 89
At best, the aforementioned cases illustrate a profound ignorance of
federal law and Establishment Clause jurisprudence. At worst, they demonstrate
IS0 Id. at 159 (Batchelder, J., concurring).
181 Settle v. Dickson Co. Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 156 (6th Cir. 1995). Curiously, the court em-
phasized that "[l]earning is more vital in the classroom than free speech," as if the two were in-
compatible in this circumstance. Id.
182 Id. Compare this result with GUIDELINES, supra note 128 ("Students may express their
beliefs about religion in the form of homework.., and other written and oral assignments free of
discrimination based on the religious content of their submissions.").
183 Van Schoick v. Saddleback Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562, 564-65 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2001).
184 See id. at 564, 569.
185 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2000).
186 Van Schoick, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 563.
187 Jon DuPre, All Extracurriculars Are Extraneous at This High School, FoxNews.com, at
http://www.foxnews.comlstory/0,2933,27826,00.html (June 21, 2001).
188 Id.
189 Id.
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explicit governmental hostility toward religion and religious people. The Oliva
and Settle decisions in particular demonstrate that the judiciary is also suscepti-
ble to such a callous attitude about religion. In both cases, the judges prevented
the litigation from reaching trial, despite significant factual and legal disputes.
But regardless of their legal rationales, -all of these cases suggest that govern-
ment entities too often impermissibly suffocate religious liberty in the name of
"separation of church and state."
IV. THE LEMON TEST AS A DEFENSE FOR RELIGIOUS HOSTILITY
As the above cases indicate, government agencies manifest hostility to-
ward religion with alarming frequency and audacity. Current Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, riddled with confusing methodologies,190 fails to provide
courts with an appropriate framework to guide their analysis of the constitution-
ality of such state actions. In addition to being particularly inadequate for the
task, the Lemon test was never intended to apply in such circumstances in the
first place. In fact, the test often serves to validate religious discrimination.
This Part will survey the relevant weaknesses of the Lemon test and explain its
inapplicability in this context. Furthermore, the following discussion will
demonstrate that the simple analysis introduced in Larson v. Valente' 9 1 provides
a principled means to determine the constitutionality of governmental acts that
are hostile to religion.
A. Introduction and Current Usage of the Lemon Test
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,192 the Supreme Court articulated a three-part test
to decide if government activity offends the Establishment Clause. Under
Lemon, government conduct violates the Establishment Clause if: (1) it does not
have a secular purpose, (2) its principal or primary effect either advances or
inhibits religion, and (3) it creates an excessive entanglement of the government
with religion.193 If the challenged practice fails any part of the three-part test,
then it violates the Establishment Clause. 194
The Supreme Court does not recognize the Lemon test as the sole au-
thoritative measure of Establishment Clause validity. 95 Moreover, a majority of
190 See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note i1, at 124-25.
191 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
192 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
193 Id. at 612-13. But see Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807-8 (2000) (plurality opinion)
(modifying the Lemon test in certain school aid contexts, reducing the excessive entanglement
prong to a factor considered under the primary effect prong).
194 See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per curiam).
195 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1983) (emphasizing the Court's "unwillingness
to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area"); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
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the sitting Justices has criticized the test, primarily for its ad hoc application. 96
Nonetheless, "[allthough widely criticized and occasionally ignored, the Lemon
test continues to govern Establishment Clause cases."' 197 Use of the Lemon test
is prevalent in the lower federal courts.'
98
B. Inherent Limits of the Lemon Test
From its very conception, the Lemon test was limited in application. In
introducing its new criteria for Establishment Clause analyses, the Lemon Court
explained the need to "draw lines with reference to the three main evils against
which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection: 'sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activ-
ity." 99 Taken together, these "evils" connote affirmative government acts that
directly benefit religion by either preferential treatment or affiliation.200 Accord-
ingly, in Larson v. Valente, the Court held that the Lemon test "[is] intended to
apply to laws affording a uniform benefit to all religions, and not to ... provi-
sions that discriminate among religions. '201 The Lemon test, therefore, detects
349, 359 (1975) ("[T]he [Lemon] tests must not be viewed as setting the precise limits to the nec-
essary constitutional inquiry, but serve only as guidelines with which to identify instances in
which the objectives of the Establishment Clause have been impaired."); see also Newdow v.
Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 2002) (observing that the Supreme Court applies three
"interrelated" Establishment Clause tests: the "endorsement test" adopted by the majority in
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), the "coercion test" introduced by the Court
in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), and the aptly-named Lemon test).
196 See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397-401
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
197 Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 344 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
530 U.S. 1251 (2000).
198 See Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 301 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1058 (2001)
(noting that the Lemon test "remains the prevailing analytical tool for the analysis of Establish-
ment Clause claims"); Kimbley v. Lawrence County, 119 F. Supp. 2d 856, 865 (S.D. Ind. 2000)
(reaffirming "the vitality of the Lemon standards"). The Books decision illustrates the need to
clarify the appropriate usage of the Lemon test (if not eliminate the test altogether). The court
stated that "[als an intermediate federal appellate court, we are obliged by the doctrines of stare
decisis and precedent to employ [the Lemon test in all Establishment Clause cases] unless in-
structed otherwise by the Supreme Court." Books, 235 F.3d at 301. But see Peck v. Upshur Co.
Bd. of Educ., 941 F. Supp. 1465, 1473 (N.D. W. Va. 1996) ("Given the Supreme Court's lack of
adherence to its own precedent, this Court declines to base its decision here [implicating the Es-
tablishment Clause] on Lemon and its progeny."), affid in part and rev'd in part, 155 F.3d 274
(4th Cir. 1998).
199 403 U.S. 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
200 Cf Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) ("When the power, prestige and financial
support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure
upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.").
201 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982); see also Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 821 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that the Lemon test was the Court's at-
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excessive government assistance to a religious group or sect that tends toward
religious establishment in violation of the First Amendment. In other words, the
test draws the line between accommodation and establishment-at least in the-
ory.
C. Inapplicability of the Lemon Test in Cases of Religious Discrimination
and Hostility
As Larson indicates, the Lemon test does not apply where government
action is discriminatory. Consequently, "when it is claimed that a denomina-
tional preference exists, the initial inquiry is whether the law facially differenti-
ates among religions. 2 °2 If the law shows such a facial preference, the Court
"appl[ies] strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality. 2 °3
A government act that discriminates among religions necessarily dis-
criminates against at least one particular religion.204 Thus, any act that facially
discriminates against any or all religion must be subjected to strict scrutiny.2 °5
Therefore, a hostile act-which is inherently discriminatory-warrants identical
206treatment.
If a government act does not display explicit religious animus, the Court
still applies the Lemon test.20 7  However, this test is ill-suited to analyze the
constitutionality of acts that may be, in effect, purposely hostile or uniquely
harmful to religion. The Lemon test's limited utility in certain circumstances is
demonstrated by the fact that the Court has frequently abandoned the test alto-
gether or created a different test.20 8 As discussed above, the Supreme Court de-
tempt "to devise a formula that would help identify the kind and degree of aid that is permitted or
forbidden by the Establishment Clause."). But see Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975)
("[The Lemon] tests constitute a convenient, accurate distillation of this Court's efforts over the
past decades to evaluate a wide range of governmental action challenged as violative of the consti-
tutional prohibition against laws 'respecting an establishment of religion."').
202 Hernandez v. Comm'r Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 695 (1989).
203 Larson, 456 U.S. at 246.
204 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1983) (noting that the Lemon test was not useful
in Larson because there was "substantial evidence of overt discrimination against a particular
church") (emphasis added).
205 See, e.g., Separation of Church & State Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617, 623
(9th.Cir. 1996) (O'Scannlain, J., concurring) (noting that the Ninth Circuit has interpreted Larson
and its progeny to require strict scrutiny where a "government statute or practice explicitly dis-
criminates against a certain religious group").
206 Cf Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 696 (noting that a statutory provision which was not "born of
animus to religion in general or [a religion] in particular" complied with the secular purpose prong
of the Lemon test).
207 See id. at 695.
208 See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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signed the Lemon test to check the limits of governmental benefits to religion,
not to detect whether a governmental act is impermissibly discriminatory or
hostile to religion. Thus, application of strict scrutiny (per Larson) should not
be limited to instances in which a government act facially discriminates against
religion. 20 9 Instead, courts must determine whether the act in question sought to
discriminate against religion or had the effect of doing so. 210 And if the action is
found discriminatory or hostile, it is per se unconstitutional. 21' This simple
analysis better reflects the original intent of the First Amendment.
Closer examination of the Lemon test itself also indicates its inability to
adjudge the constitutionality of hostile state actions directed at religion.212 In
this regard, the "secular purpose" prong is arguably the weakest component of
the Lemon test. The Court gives a governmental body much deference in de-
termining whether the purpose of its action is sufficiently "secular. 2 13 Indeed,
209 Cf Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 n.13 (requiring "strict scrutiny of a statute or practice patently
discriminatory on its face").
210 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). However, the govern-
mental act generally does not violate the First Amendment if it is a valid and neutral (i.e., unbi-
ased) law of general applicability. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Oregon v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
211 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984). Of course, this begs the question: How
do judges and juries determine whether a governmental act is hostile to religion? Some acts, like
denying religious groups equal access to a public forum, are hostile or discriminatory per se. See
supra Part II.C.2. Most such acts violate either the free speech or the free exercise clause anyway.
The more difficult questions often arise when 1) a government act ostensibly has a nonreligious
purpose but effectively discriminates against religious groups; 2) a government act facially
evinces religious hostility but appears to have a nominal, if any, effect on religious freedom; or 3)
the legislative history suggests that religious hostility motivated a government act but the act itself
has an immeasurable effect on religious freedom. These cases generally do not lend themselves to
a new, straightforward "test." An equal protection mode analysis may be appropriate. See Walz,
397 U.S. at 696; Paulsen supra note 39, at 331. Or perhaps a reasonable, informed observer ap-
proach could work. See generally Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753, 772-83 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing and applying the reasonable, informed
observer approach). Nonetheless, whether a government act discriminates against or evinces
hostility toward religion should usually be a fairly commonsensical question.
212 Legal scholarship and commentary is replete with criticism of the Lemon test generally.
See, e.g., Thomas C. Marks, Jr. & Michael Bertolini, Lemon is a Lemon: Toward a Rational In-
terpretation of the Establishment Clause, 12 BYU J. PuB. L. (1997); William B. Petersen, 'A
Picture Held Us Captive': Conceptual Confusion and the Lemon Test, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1827
(1989); Kenneth M. Cox, The Lemon Test Soured: The Supreme Court's New Establishment
Clause Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1175 (1984); see also Paulsen supra note 39, at 317 ("[T]he
Lemon test has not made for very predictable adjudication. More fundamentally, the test itself is
premised on an underlying view of the establishment clause which is both historically unjustified
and textually incoherent."). Here, the author only intends to highlight major flaws of the Lemon
test, especially as they pertain to analyzing acts of religious hostility or indifference.
213 See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983) (indicating the Court's "reluctance to
attribute unconstitutional motives to the States, particularly when a plausible secular purpose for
the State's program may be discerned from the face of the statute"). But see Edwards v. Aguil-
lard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-87 (1987) ("While the Court is normally deferential to a State's articula-
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"[t]he Court has invalidated legislation or governmental action on the ground
that a secular purpose was lacking, but only when it has concluded there was no
question that the statute or activity was motivated wholly by religious considera-
tions. '1 4 Thus, a court can easily construe a hostile act toward religion as hav-
ing a secular (i.e., nonreligious) purpose. Likewise, a government can easily
feign a legitimate secularpurpose for displaying religious hostility (e.g., advanc-
ing the public welfare).21 Consequently, "[t]o the extent that Lemon's purpose
prong requires the government to turn a blind eye to the impact of its actions on
religion, on the implicit assumption that secular effects are all that matter, it is a
recipe for intolerance. 21 6
The "primary effect" prong also suffers from significant flaws.217 One
commentator observes that this test "has proved analytically more difficult for
the Court to apply than the secular purpose criterion, because in every case rais-
ing an establishment clause question the challenged law or government activity
undeniably provides some benefit or hindrance to religion. 218  Furthermore,
Professor Michael W. McConnell contends that the effect prong actually fosters
discrimination against religion in two ways:
First, [although] government action often benefits (or 'ad-
vances') a broad range of activities and institutions.... the ef-
fects prong implies that the benefitted class may not include re-
ligious activities or institutions. . . . Second, the effects prong
fails to distinguish between advancing religion and advancing
religious freedom[,] ... [which] interferes with benign govern-
ment actions to accommodate or facilitate free religious exer-
219
cise.
tion of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement of such purpose be sincere and not a
sham.").
214 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680. This implies that governmental acts motivated primarily by anti-
religious sentiment could pass the secular purpose test, which contradicts the holding of Larson.
215 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The purpose
prong means little if it only requires the legislature to express any secular purpose and omit all
sectarian references, because legislators might do just that.").
216 Michael W. McConnell, Religious Participation in Public Programs: Religious Freedom at
a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 129 (1992).
217 Justice Rehnquist has asserted that both the purpose and effect prongs have no basis in the
history or intent of the Establishment Clause. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 108 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing).
218 Cox, supra note 212, at 1182.
219 McConnell, supra note 216, at 129; see also Wallace, 472 U.S. at 82 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) ("[A] rigid application of the Lemon test would invalidate legislation exempting religious
observers from generally applicable government obligations. By definition, such legislation has a
religious purpose and effect in promoting the free exercise of religion.").
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Furthermore, the effect test represents sheer jurisprudential hypocrisy.
No court in any jurisdiction has struck down a law that allegedly had the pri-
mary effect of inhibiting religion.220 Conversely, courts have upheld myriad
laws that substantially inhibit religion and have a much less discernible effect on
other groups.221 Thus, the presumably equal proscription of legislative acts that
advance or inhibit religion has proven to be little more than rhetoric.
Finally, the "excessive entanglement" prong similarly fails to suffi-
ciently appraise the constitutionality of state actions imbued with religious hos-
tility. The Court generally analyzes the question of excessive entanglement by
considering the administrative entanglement and political divisiveness involved
with a government act.222 However, the court confines the question of political
divisiveness to "cases where direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial
schools or to teachers in parochial schools., 223 For administrative entanglement,
the Court "examine[s] the character and purposes of the institutions that are
benefited, the nature of the aid that the state provides, and the resulting relation-
ship between the government and the religious authority. '224 However, this
mode of analysis also presupposes some benefit being given to a religious group
and is thus clearly inappropriate to assess the constitutionality of hostile gov-
ernmental acts.225 Moreover, the "excessive entanglement" prong is no longer
given much weight in most Lemon test analyses.226
D. American Family Association v. San Francisco - Illustrating the Flaws
of the Lemon Test
American Family Association v. San Francisco,227 a recent Ninth Circuit
case, poignantly illustrates the failings of the Lemon test. In American Family
Association, the plaintiffs, a group of Christian ministries (the "Ministries"),
220 Of course, claims for inhibition of religious practice are more appropriately brought under
the Free Exercise Clause anyway, which further belies the utility of the Lemon test in adjudging
government hostility toward religion.
221 See, e.g., St. Agnes Hosp. v. Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319 (D. Md. 1990) (upholding an ac-
creditation standard that required a Roman Catholic hospital to teach all residents how to perform
abortions, irrespective of the hospital's strong moral and religious objection to the procedure).
222 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984).
223 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617 n. 14 (1988).
224 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971).
225 This fact also supports the argument that the Lemon test was never intended to evaluate
hostile governmental acts aimed at religion.
226 See supra note 193.
227 277 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 129 (2002).
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sought to enjoin the City and County of San Francisco from openly condemning
the Ministries' religious beliefs about homosexuality. 28
1. Factual Background
In 1998, the Ministries joined with other religious groups in sponsoring
a national advertising campaign called "Truth in Love," which sought to reach
the homosexual community. In the ads,229 the Ministries expressed their reli-
gious beliefs that homosexuality is a sin and that homosexuals can be delivered
from their sin through the power of Jesus Christ.230 Specifically, the ad at issue
stated:
We believe every human being is precious to God and is enti-
tled to respect. But when we see great suffering among homo-
sexuals, it's an inherent Christian calling to show compassion
and concern. The truth we know is that God abhors any form of
sexual sin, be it premarital sex, adultery, prostitution, or homo-
sexuality.23'
For years, Christians have taken a stand in the public square
against aggressive homosexual activism. We've paid a
heavy price, with sound-bite labels like "bigot" and "homo-
phobe." But all along we've had a hand extended, something
largely unreported in the media ... an open hand that offers
healing for homosexuals, not harassment. We want reason in
this debate, not rhetoric. And we want to share the hope we
have in Christ, for those who feel acceptance of homosexual-
ity is their only hope.2
32
The ads also discussed the psychological and physical health risks associated
with homosexual behavior.
228 Id. at 1120.
229 The "Truth in Love" campaign's 1998 newspaper ads may be viewed at
http://www.cwfa.org/library/family/truthinlove/1998.shtm]. The television ads run by "Truth in
Love" in 1999 may be viewed at http://www.cwfa.org/library/family/truthinlove/.
230 See Am. Family Ass'n, 277 F.3d at 1119.
231 Am. Family Ass'n v. San Francisco, No. C 99-4469 SBA (N.D. Cal June 5, 2000) (on file
with author).
232 Am. Family Ass'n, 277 F.3d at 1119.
233 Id.
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The controversy arose after the Ministries ran a full-page advertisement
(quoted above, in part) in the San Francisco Chronicle. In response to the ad,
the San Francisco Board of Supervisors sent a letter to the Ministries, the body
of which read:
Supervisor Leslie Katz denounces your hateful rhetoric against
gays, lesbians and transgendered people.
What happened to Matthew Shepard is in part due to the mes-
sage being espoused by your groups that gays and lesbians are
not worthy of the most basic equal rights and treatment.
It is not an exaggeration to say that there is a direct correlation
between these acts of discrimination, such as when gays and
lesbians are called sinful and when major religious organiza-
tions say they can change if they tried, and the horrible crimes
committed against gays and lesbians.2 4
The City and County of San Francisco also formally adopted two reso-
lutions that attacked the Ministries religious beliefs on homosexuality. The first
resolution described the Ministries as a "radical religious political conservative
coalition" and asserted that the ad campaign's insinuation that sexual orientation
could be changed is "erroneous and full of lies. 235 The resolution ultimately
"urged local television stations not to broadcast campaigns aimed at 'convert-
ing' homosexuals. 23 6 After the adoption of this resolution, the Ministries at-
tempted to purchase air time on San Francisco television stations. 237 No San
Francisco station would accept the ads.238
The second resolution, adopted several months later, condemned the
murder of Billy Jack Gaither, an Alabama man who was killed allegedly be-
cause of his homosexuality. 239 This resolution concluded by "call[ing] for the
Religious Right to take accountability for the impact of their long-standing
rhetoric denouncing gays and lesbians, which leads to a climate of mistrust and
234 Id. The author encourages readers to view the ads in their entirety to see whether or not any
of them-particularly the ad that ran in the San Francisco Chronicle--constituted "hateful rheto-
ric." To read the printed ads, see supra note 229 for the appropriate web site.
235 Am. Family Ass'n v. San Francisco, No. C 99-4469 SBA, slip op. at 8, 3 (N.D. Cal. June 5,
2000).
236 Am. Family Ass 'n, 277 F.3d at 120.
237 Am. Family Ass 'n, No. C 99-4469 SBA, at 3.
238 Id.
239 Am. Family Ass 'n, 277 F.3d at 1119.
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discrimination that can open the door to horrible crimes such as those committed
against Mr. Gaither.,
240
The Ministries filed suit against Leslie Katz and the City and County of
San Francisco, claiming that the letter and the resolutions violated the Estab-
lishment Clause and also infringed upon their rights of free religious exercise
and free speech. 24' The district court dismissed all of the Ministries' claims, and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed.242
2. The Ninth Circuit's Suspect Analysis
In adjudicating the Ministries' Establishment Clause claim, the Ninth
Circuit first erred by utilizing the Lemon test. The court noted that "[a]lthough
the Lemon test is perhaps most frequently used in cases involving government
allegedly giving preference to a religion, the Lemon test accommodates the
analysis of a claim brought under a hostility to religion theory as well.,
243
However, this assertion patently contradicts Larson, which restricted Lemon's
applicability to cases where government action benefited religion. 244 The clear
presence of "overt discrimination" against the Ministries' religious beliefs
should have rendered the Lemon test inapposite.245
The court then compounded its initial error by improperly applying the
Lemon test. In particular, the court's analysis of the primary effect prong defied
logic and ignored material allegations. In its discussion of the effect of the letter
and the first resolution, the court conceded that "it may be inferred that the De-
fendants are hostile towards the religious view that homosexuality is sinful or
immoral." 246 Nonetheless, the court concluded that the primary effects of these
governmental acts were the encouragement of equal rights for gays and the dis-
couragement of hate crimes.247
The court's reasoning confuses the principal effect of the governmental
acts with their professed purpose. An effect is a result, not a reason. Yet the
court found that "promoting equality for gays and discouraging violence against
them" was the effect of the letter and the first resolution. 248 To the contrary, this
was a plausible secular purpose, which "does not neutralize the effect of the
240 Id.
241 Id. at 1120.
242 Id. at 1120, 1125.
243 Id. at 1121. But see supra notes 199-226 and accompanying text.
244 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982).
245 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
246 Am. Family Ass 'n, 277 F.3d at 1122.
247 Id. at 1122-23.
248 Id. at 1122.
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means chosen by the city - a means that achieves its effect by its assertion of a
direct correlation between the plaintiffs' religious beliefs and the killing of hu-
man beings., 249 Thus, irrespective of the defendants' motivations, the result of
their actions was the explicit communication of disapproval, if not condemna-
tion, of the plaintiffs' religious beliefs. Indeed, "[t]o assert that a group's reli-
gious message and religious categorization of conduct are responsible for mur-
der is to attack the group's religion. 25°
The court also ignored the Ministries' allegation that local television
stations "refused [the Ministries'] ads at least in part because of the resolution of
the Defendants urging them not to accept ads from [the Ministries]. '251  If
proven, this would constitute a tangible and primary effect of the defendants'
first resolution, which would consequently violate the Religion and Free Speech
Clauses. As such, "[t]he allegation of official action blocking access to the air
because the city disapproved of the [Ministries'] beliefs is surely sufficient to
state a claim of free speech and free exercise of religion denied.,
252
In addition, the Ninth Circuit's application of the secular purpose prong
exposed the ambiguity surrounding that component of the Lemon test. The
court concluded that only a "plausible" secular purpose was necessary, as sug-
gested by the Supreme Court in Mueller v. Allen253 and Bowen v. Kendrick.25
However, the court acknowledged that Supreme Court precedent also suggests
249 Id. at 1126-27 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
250 Id. at 1126 (Noonan, J., dissenting). In his vigorous dissent, Judge Noonan offered an inci-
sive hypothetical that illuminated the defective logic of the majority:
Suppose a city council today, in the year 2002, adopted a resolution condemn-
ing Islam because its teachings embraced the concept of a holy war and so, the
resolution said, were "directly correlated" with the bombing of the World
Trade Center. Plausibly the purpose might be to discourage terror bombings.
Would any reasonable, informed observer doubt that the primary effect of
such an action by a city could be the expression of official hostility to the re-
ligion practiced by a billion people?
Id. at 1127 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
251 Id. at 1127 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
25 Id. The Ninth Circuit's circumvention of the standard of review governing this dispute
constitutes yet another fatal flaw in its analysis. The case required the court to rule on motions to
dismiss, for which the court must not only accept all of the plaintiffs' allegations as true but also
draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. Id. at 1120 ("A complaint should not be dismissed
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim
that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.") (citing Williamson v. General Dynamics Corp., 208 F.3d
1144, 1149 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 929 (2000)) (emphasis added); id. at 1126 (Noonan,
J., dissenting). Here, however, the court usurped the function of the jury by accepting as true the
defendants' factual assertions regarding the effects of their actions.
253 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983).
254 487 U.S. 589, 602 (1988).
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that the "actual" or "primary" purpose must be secular.255 Court precedent does,
in fact, send mixed messages as to what makes a sufficient secular purpose, and
the Ninth Circuit conveniently chose the lowest possible threshold to satisfy that
prong of the test.
This case also proves the impotence of the secular purpose prong in cur-
tailing religious hostility. The court indicated that even if the government acts
with an obviously anti-religious purpose, an additional "plausible secular pur-
pose" saves the governmental act from violating the Lemon test. 256 Therefore,
by the court's reasoning, post hoc "secular" justifications can normally ratify
decidedly hostile acts toward religious groups under the secular purpose prong.
In other words, the government can take sides in a religious dispute-as long as
it means well and there is no substantial measurable effect on religion.
The Ninth Circuit's seemingly manipulative application of the secular
purpose and primary effect prongs demonstrates the fatal malleability of the
Lemon test generally and its incompetence to analyze cases of religious hostility
specifically. Moreover, that the court 1) ignored its own standard of review, 2)
errantly applied the Lemon test, and 3) rationalized the actions of Leslie Katz
and the City and County of San Francisco may reveal its own latent indifference
or hostility toward the religious message of the Ministries.
In sum, the Lemon test is an inappropriate means to adjudicate Estab-
lishment Clause claims of religious hostility. As the aforementioned discussion
confirms, application of Lemon in such instances not only defies precedent and
logic but also allows courts to validate government hostility toward religion.
Thus, to protect religious freedoms against such state-sanctioned antagonism,
courts must adopt a principled standard that identifies religious hostility and
declares it unconstitutional per se.
V. CONCLUSION
The piety of Americans is a defining characteristic of our country. "In
times of peace and prosperity as well as in war and tragedy, the nation and its
leaders have paid homage to the God many believe is the author and sustainer of
life and liberty. And they have ordered their lives and laws according to widely
shared principles informed by a rich tapestry of religious traditions. 25 7
By preventing the government from prescribing religious orthodoxy, the
Establishment Clause has been particularly vital to the preservation of Amer-
ica's "rich tapestry of religious traditions." To be sure, the Establishment Clause
is a bulwark of religious liberty, not a constitutional device to insulate society
from religious influences. Indeed,
255 Am. Family Ass'n, 277 F.3d at 1121 (citing Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385,
1397 (9th Cir. 1994)).
256 See id.
257 Jeffery L. Sheler, Faith in America, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 6, 2002, at 40.
2002]
37
Cogar: Government Hostility to Religion: How Misconstruction of the Esta
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
religious liberty is indisputably what the Framers intended and
what the First Amendment has preserved. Far from being a
matter of exemption, exception or even toleration, religious lib-
erty is an unalienable right. Far from being a subcategory of
free speech or a constitutional redundancy, religious liberty is
distinct and foundational. Far from being an individual right,
religious liberty is a positive social good.
Accordingly, the Establishment Clause requires benevolent neutrality toward
religion, not a cultural separation of religion and state. Thus, any governmental
act that is purposefully hostile to religion clearly falls short of this constitutional
mandate.
A proper understanding and application of the Establishment Clause is
vital to protect religious liberty. And "[i]f religious liberty is neglected, all civil
liberties will suffer. If it is guarded and sustained, the American experiment
will be the more secure. '259
Andrew R. Cogar*
258 The Williamsburg Charter, supra note 6, at 132.
259 The Williamsburg Charter, supra note 6, at 124.
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